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ABSTRACT 
Accidents on construction sites are a major cause of morbidity and mortality in 
Hong Kong. This study investigated the likely causes of occupational injuries that 
were present among the construction workers during the construction of the new 
Chep Lap Kok (CLK) Airport in Hong Kong. In order to accumulate the requisite 
information, 1648 accident investigation reports in a four-year period (1993-1996) 
were reviewed. The first part of the study described the pattern and magnitude of 
occupational injuries among the CLK construction workers and compared the 
accident rates of the CLK workers with those of the construction industry as a whole 
in Hong Kong. The study examined the effects of the workplace infrastructure at 
CLK in order to explain why this site presented fewer work place injuries and 
accidents than other workplaces. The second part of the research used these injury 
and accident occurrences as the basis to construct the causes of accidents and injuries 
within an error causation classification system. The results showed that at CLK, the 
commonest workplace injury was contusion & crushing which appeared to be due to 
mistakes made through lapses in memory often caused by pressure of work being 
imposed on the employee. This section also indicated what types of errors were 
most closely associated with what kinds of injuries and what conditions were most 
likely to trigger these types of events. Among the major associations were links 
between contusion and crushing and violation error, perceptual error; between 
memory lapse and work pressure, equipment deficiencies, poor working environment, 
fatigue, and between violation error and work pressure. The research suggested that 
work pressure was an important contributing factor to construction injury and it 
increased the prevalence of a human error type namely, memory lapse many fold. 
The outcomes from this study provide important new information on the causes and 
types of errors which have led to occupational injuries among construction workers in 
Hong Kong. A better understanding of the human factors-based causes of accidents 
and injuries in the construction industry and an inculcation of a safety culture on 
construction sites are critically important in the reduction of the rate of construction 
accidents and improvement of workers' human performance. The results should 
assist the construction industry in the designing accident prevention training and 
education strategies, estimating human error probabilities, and the monitoring 
organizational safety performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Construction industry in Hong Kong 
The construction industry in Hong Kong, where the bamboo scaffolds and iron 
girders meet, is very unique, particularly with regard to health and safety issues . The 
occupational accident and mortality rates of Hong Kong construction workers are still 
higher than in Western countries (Lee, 1996; Lindqvisdt, 1989; Snashall, 1990). 
Perhaps due to better informat ion, instruction and training in safety issues and more 
enforceable local laws and regulations (Construction Site Safety Regulations, Safety 
Officers and Safety Supervisors Regulations, etc.), between the years 1993 and 1996, 
the annual accident rate per 1000 workers dropped from 294 in 1993 to 220 in 1996 
(Hong Kong Government, 1993, I 994, 1995, 1996). The mortality rate per 1000 
construction workers per year also reduced from 1.4 in 1993 to 0.628 in 1996 (Hong 
Kong Government, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996). However, w hen one compares these 
Hong Kong figures with those from the construction industry in the United Kingdom 
(about 10 fatality fo r every 100,000 employed a year) (Snashall, 1990), the 
corresponding accident rates in Hong Kong are at least six times higher (Lee, 1996). 
The construction industry is one of the major economic pillars of the Hong Kong 
economy, with a workforce of 56,226 (6.0% of total full-time workforce) in 1993 
(Hong Kong Government, 1993). Yet this industry accounted for more than 
one-third of all industrial injuries ( 16,573 injuries, 35.4%) and more than 
three-quarters of all fatal industrial accidents (80 deaths, 87.0%) in the same year 
(Hong Kong Government, 1993). 
Construction is considered to be one of the most dangerous industries (Snashall, 
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1990). Many accidents and injuries happened onsite can cost human lives and a lot 
of human sufferings. In addition, they are enormous financial burdens to the society. 
The Compensation for Injured Workers Scheme, Employee 's Compensation Division, 
Hong Kong estimated that the mean health cost per each injured worker was in the 
region of HK$ I 0,000 and the compensation costs for loss of earning capacity and 
sickness absence amounted to HK$40,000 per person (Hong Kong Government, 
1997). Other social costs were not included. Evidently, construction accidents and 
injuries must be reduced without delay as they continuously cause human lives and 
sufferings and are huge financial burdens to the society. 
Why do construction site accidents happen? 
The answer may not be as straightforward as one thinks. In the early years of 
the construction industry it could reasonably be said that machinery was largely 
responsible for the majority of construction site accidents. Similarly, early aircraft 
were seen to be intrinsically unsafe and were blamed for causing many accidents. 
However, as building machinery and aircraft became more and more reliable, humans, 
rather than the technology inherent in the aircraft's construction were seen to be more 
pivotal to the causes of aviation accidents. 
In the early 1990s, the decision to build a new airport at Chep Lap Kok (CLK) 
in Hong Kong attracted thousands of skilled and unskilled workers from developing 
as well as industrialised countries . With a massive labour force , the total number of 
construction workers on site could be as high as 20,000 a day. The Airport 
Authority employed many safety consultants to provide, guidance and 
recommendations on how to reduce, onsite accidents and injuries. These included: 
compulsory health and safety (H&S) introduction course for all new recruits, 
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adoption of occupational and H&S guidelines, deployment of a H&S team to monitor 
and review work environment and work processes, regular H&S meetings and reports, 
workshops and tool box talks, financial incentives for good H&S practices and 
penalties for poor H&S performers (Airport Authority, 1995). However, no formal 
comparative study was commissioned to investigate if these CLK workers with the 
alleged better training in health and safety practice systems actually resulted in fewer 
injuries at work, when compared to construction sites lacking in support systems 
Over the past few decades there has been increasing research evidence that 
unsafe behaviour among human operators is one of the most pressing threats to the 
safety of complex technological systems. It has been estimated that human error is 
involved in 58% of all medical misadventures (Leape et al., 1991 ), 70% of aircraft 
accidents (Hawkins, 1993), and 80% of shipping accidents (Lucas, 1997). However, 
there has been far less research devoted to human factors-based causes of accidents 
and injuries in the construction industry, and almost no research at all in relation to 
Hong Kong's industry. If parallels can be drawn between adverse events in the 
aviation industry and construction industry then it behoves the construction industry 
to urgently understand what human factor issues are critically important to any 
reduction in the rate of these negative occurrences and how improvements to workers' 
human performance can be planned . 
The development of the human factors concept 
In recent years cognitive error models have provided insights into the unsafe 
acts that lead to many accidents and a variety of generic cognitive taxonomies have 
been used to account for errors in safety-critical environments (Senders, 1991 ). The 
major ones include the cognitive, ergonomic, behavioural, aeromedical , psychological 
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and organizational perspectives. 
disadvantages. 
They all have distinct advantages and 
From the cognitive perspective, it is assumed that the construction worker's 
mind can be conceptualized as essentially an information processing system. Once 
information from the environment makes contact with one of the senses (e.g. , vision, 
touch, smell , etc.), it progresses through a series of stages or mental operations, 
culminating in a response. Wickens and Flach (1988) have described a basic model 
of information processing as shown in Figure 1. 
Attentional Processes 
Pattern 
Recognition 
Long Term 
Memory 
Feedback Loop 
Figure I. Basic model of information processing. 
Source: Adapted from Wickens and Flach (/988). 
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They also suggested that stimuli from environment (e.g. , light or sound) are 
converted into neural impulse and stored temporarily in a short-term sensory store 
(e.g. , iconic or echoic memory). Provided sufficient attention is devoted to the 
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stimulus, information from the short term sensory store is then compared with a 
previous pattern held in long-term memory to create a mental representation of the 
current state of the world. From there, an individual must decide if the information 
they collected requires a response or can simply be ignored until something 
significant occurred. The response action taken should normally ensure the situation 
was resolved. [f not a feedback loop would stimulate the system to make the 
necessary modification and an adjustment until the situation was resolved. Using 
this information processing mock-up, Wickens and Flach (1988) further proposed a 
decision-making model as displayed in Figure 2 . 
Perception 
and 
Attention 
Cues 
-
= 
~ 
~ 
-· 
.... 
. 
-· •• ~ 
Working 
Memory 
. 
: 
r--+ 
-
. > 
~ 
- -
-- --- -- --- -- -- - ------- -
Hypothesis 
Generation 
-Long Term Memory 
Figure 2. Decision-making model. 
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An individual will sample a variety of cues in the environment to assess a given 
situation. These cues are then compared against a knowledge base contained within 
long-term memory so that an accurate diagnosis of the situation can take place. 
Given that a problem has been identified, choices have to be made regarding what 
action, or actions, should be taken. 
In this model an evaluation and assessment of the possible risks that such 
actions might create should be inherent within the execution of appropriately learned 
behaviour. Unfortunately, errors can arise at many points during this process. 
Individuals may correctly assess their current state of affairs but choose the wrong 
solution or take unnecessary risks resulting in failure. Or the worker may not have 
the skills necessary to avert disaster. Likewise, Rasmussen (1982) developed a 
detailed taxonomic algorithm for classifying information processing failures. This 
algorithm includes stimulus detection, system diagnosis, goal setting, strategy 
selection, procedure adoption and action stages, all of which can either fail 
independently or in conjunction with one another to cause an error. This algorithm 
has been employed widely within the context of aviation (e.g. , O'Hare et al. , 1994; 
Wiegmann & Shappell , 1999; Zotov, 1997). These cognitive models allow 
seemingly unrelated errors to be analyzed based on fundamental cognitive failures 
and scientific principles. Wiegmann and Shappell (1999) analyzed over 4500 
pilot-causal factors associated with nearly 2000 U.S. Naval aviation accidents. 
Judgment errors ( e.g., decision making, goal setting and strategy selection errors) 
were associated more often with major accidents, whilst procedural and response 
execution errors were more likely to lead to minor accidents. According to the 
cognitive perspective (Wickens & Flash, 1988), any intervention should target the 
construction workers' information processing capability. However, the information 
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processing hardware of humans (i.e., the brain) is generally fixed. Therefore, in 
order to improve performance, cognitive psychologists can attempt to capitalize on 
the manner in which workers process information. For example, examining how 
expert engineers solve problems or distribute their attention in the construction site 
can help scientists develop better methods for training novice workmen. Another 
way of improving information processing is through the standardization of 
procedures and use of checklists. These methods often facilitate information 
processing by reducing mental workload and task demands during normal operations 
and emergencies, thereby reducing the potential for error and accidents. However, 
many cognitive theories are quite academic and difficult to translate into the applied 
world of error analysis and accident investigation (Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2001). 
They rely a lot on speculation and intuition. They do not address contextual or 
task-re lated factors such as equipment design or environmental conditions like 
temperature, n01se and vibration. Nor do they consider fatigue , illness and 
motivational fac tors impacting on workers decision-making and information 
processmg. Perhaps more importantly, supervisory and other organizational factors 
that often impact performance are also overlooked and consequently, the operators are 
often blamed as the cause of the error and the accident. 
From the ergonomic or systems perspective, humans are rarely the sole cause 
of an error or accident. Edwards (1972) proposed a SHEL model. "S" represents 
software or rules and regulations. "H" refers to the hardware such as equipment, 
material, and physical assets. "E" refers to environment and is created to account 
for the physical working conditions that human ("L" or liveware) is faced with. He 
recognized that there were interactions between these four components and felt that it 
was at the boundaries of these interfaces that many problems or mismatches occurred 
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(e.g., in the live-hardware interface, better known as the human-machine interface). 
More recently, another "L" (liveware) and a "C" (culture) have been added to the 
SHEL model to become the SCHELL model (Edwards, 1988). The 
liveware-liveware interface is between people. The individual who makes up the 
liveware is subject to limitations of human performance. Some of these limitations 
will vary from day to day and between individuals whereas other absolute limitations 
vary little between different people. The liveware-culure interface is the 
organizational and cultural shell that provides interpretative differences for the way in 
which individual behave and the values and expectations they hold for the 
hardware-software-environment manipulations that they make. Helmreich (1991) 
found that there was a great variability among crew operating the same type of 
aircraft. Even greater variability was found between companies and countries. The 
interpretation by crews of the policies and practices of airline management, 
government regulatory agencies and international authorities and associations is many 
and varied . As a consequence, many well-conceived initiatives, training, safety 
procedures fail because what is taught or what is attempted to be introduced is poorly 
designed with the culture of the organization where the work is done. However, in 
day-to-day operations, multi-dimensional models are more typical than the 
two-dimensional interfaces as described. Unfortunately, these multi-dimensional 
interactions are often hidden from the operator, producing opaque systems, which if 
not designed properly, can detract from the monitoring and diagnosis of system 
problems, thereby producing accidents. Firenze (1971) suggested that humans 
would make decisions based upon information they had acquired. He predicted that 
system failure occurred when there was a mismatch between the human, machine and 
environment components. Furthermore, problems arose when stressors such as 
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anxiety, fatigue and hazardous attitudes could distort or impede the decision making 
process and lead to an accident. Therefore, efforts must focus on the system as a 
whole, not just the human component. As these system models focus on the 
interaction among components, emphasis is placed almost exclusively on the design 
aspects of the man-machine interface as well as the possible mismatch between the 
anthropometric requirements of the task and human characteristics. The effects of 
cognitive, social and organizational factors receive little consideration, giving the 
impression that these components of the system are relatively unimportant. The 
ergonomic perspective tends to promulgate the notion that all errors and accidents are 
design-induced and can therefore be engineered out of the system. Behm (2005) 
reviewed 224 fatality investigation reports and showed that 42% of fatalities were 
linked to designed-induced construction accidents. Hazards should be designed out 
such that they are eliminated or reduced before workers are exposed and then forced 
to react to minimize these hazards . 
From a behavioural perspective, followers believe that performance is guided 
by the drive to obtain rewards and avoid unpleasant consequences or punishment 
(Skinner, 197 4 ). Peterson ( 1971) expressed the view that performance depended 
upon one 's innate ability and motivation, which in turn was dependent on a number of 
other factors (i.e. , job climate, personal achievement, promotion, peer group pressure, 
previous training, selection for the job, etc.). However, motivation and ability alone 
cannot fully explain how people behave. In Peterson's model , he talked about the 
extent to which individuals felt satisfied about their performance, which in turn was 
largely dependent on the rewards they received within the organization. Ultimately, 
it is this feeling of satisfaction that motivates individuals to perform the same action 
again and again. When an individual's lack of motivation to perform safely, or when 
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conditions exist that reward unsafe actions, rather than those that are safe , accidents 
will likely occur. However, in the construction industry, with heavy equipment, 
often located in difficult operational spaces the consequences of unsafe behaviour can 
be fatal. Individuals probably do not knowingly want to performance at anything 
less than their best. The consequences for performing the tasks badly are too risky. 
Aviation has taught us much about how to approach human factors. From an 
aeromedical perspective, errors are thought to be merely systems of an underlying 
mental or physiological condition such as illness or fatigue. When they are triggered 
by environmental conditions or situations that promote their manifestation, accidents 
occur. Reinhart (1996) suggested that physiology affected virtually all aspects of 
safe behaviour. Suchman (1961) proposed an epidemiological model of accident 
causation, in which the investigator sought an explanation for the occurrence of an 
accident within the host (accident victim), the agent (injury or damage deliver), and 
environmental factors (physical, social and psychological characteristics of a 
particular accident setting). The physiological state of the pilot (i.e. , the host) plays 
an important role in safe performance and flight operations (Lauber, 1996), yet many 
investigators have not always taken the aeromedical perspective seriously. 
Furthermore, training in physiology within the construction industry has been noted 
to be very limited, and understanding of the impact of adverse physiological states 
such as fatigue, noise, heat, etc. on worker performance is poor. 
From the psychosocial perspective, supporters view flight operations as a social 
endeavour that involves interactions among many individuals including pilots, 
air-traffic controllers, dispatchers , ground crew, maintenance personnel and flight 
attendants. Helmreich and Foushee (1993) suggested that pilot performance was 
directly influenced by the nature or quality of the interactions among group members. 
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The interactions in turn were influenced not only by the operating environment but 
also by the personalities and attitudes of individuals within each group. As there is a 
much larger variety of trades and disciplines in a construction site, the interactions 
among themselves will be enormous. It is only when the delicate balance between 
group dynamics and interpersonal communication and coordination breaks down that 
errors and accidents occur. Lautman and Gallimore (1987) found that over 70 
percent of all civilian aviation accidents resulted from aircrew coordination and 
communication problems. Wiegmann and Shappell (1999) and Yacavone (1993) 
also discovered that aircrew coordination failure has been the major cause of military 
aviation accidents . These complex issues of human interpersonal relationships must 
be addressed and intervention strategies should aim at improving construction site 
communications. 
From the organizational perspective, the role organizations (not just workers 
and machinery but managers, supervisors and others in the construction site) play in 
accident causation and in the management of human error is important. Even as 
long ago as the l 970 's, Bird (1974) proposed a domino theory of accident causation 
and described the cascading nature of human error as beginning with the failure of 
management to control losses within the organization. If management fails at any of 
their managerial tasks (e.g. , identifying and assigning work, establishing performance 
standards, measuring performance, making corrections to ensure that the job gets 
done) basic or underlying personal (e .g., inadequate knowledge/skill , physical and 
mental problems) and job-related fac tors (e.g. , inadequate work standards, abnormal 
usage.) will begin to appear. These basic causes often lead to what Bird referred to 
as immediate causes such as unsafe acts or conditions committed by 
employee/operators like the unauthorised use of equipment, misuse of safety devices 
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or other unsafe operations. Ultimately, it is these immediate causes that lead to 
accidents and injury. Adam (1976) renamed and expanded Bird's domino theory. 
He included elements of management structure, operational errors and tactical errors, 
and operationalised Bird 's original ideas for use in industry. Weaver (1971) exposed 
operational error by examining not only what caused the accident, but also why the 
unsafe act was permitted and whether the management had the safety knowledge to 
prevent the accident. Degani and Wiener (1994) proposed the four "P's" for 
operations on the flight deck. They focused on the relationship between the four 
"P 's": 1) Management 's philosophy or broad-based view about how they would 
conduct business; 2) Policies regarding how operations were to be performed; 3) 
Procedures and/or specifications concerning how certain actions were to be executed; 
and 4) Practices of aircrew as they performed flight-related duties . All of these 
factors interact to enhance work safety. However, the entire system can break down 
if fo r example, the philosophy of the organization drives policies that are motivated 
more by profit than safety (e.g. , an on-time departure at all cost, an on-time 
completion of a building at all cost, etc.). Misguided corporate attitudes can also 
lead to poor or misinterpreted procedures. As little is known about the types of 
organizational variables that actually cause specific types of errors in the cockpit or in 
the construction site, the practicality of an organizational approach for reducing or 
preventing operator error would be difficult. Furthermore, organizational models 
tend to focus almost exclusive on a single type of causal-factor, (i.e. the managers and 
supervisors) rather than the worker themselves. They also tend to foster the extreme 
view that every accident is a failure of the organization or its management. 
It appears that none of the perspectives described previously were able to 
address all the plethora of human causal factors associated with construction 
14 
accidents. It was not until 1990 when James Reason published his model on human 
error that radical new thinking on performance in safety critical industries such as 
aviation, health, and high technology endeavours began to emerge. 
Reason's Model of human error 
Reason's Model of human error leading to accident causation was originally 
developed for the nuclear power industry. This approach was based on the 
assumption that there were fundamental elements of all organizations that must work 
together harmoniously if efficient and safe operations were to occur. These 
elements comprised a "productive system" as showed in Figure 3. 
15 
Inputs (Social, Economical, Political) 
il 
......... 
•••••••JJ.ijclsi<>n•: 
.·.·.·.·.·. ·. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· 
:::::::::M·: is:i~:~;j.;s>::: 
.·.·.·.·.· ·H-J\.,-,;1' · .·.· 
.·.·.·.·.· .. · ....... · .. ·.·-·.· 
C)>tiJ~#atf •: •: •: • > •: i • 
..... . ...... .. .. . ·-"'--------, 
M~~t~#.e~t <<<<<< ..... 
.• : •. ::·•···(i:(:::••··:·:·•: ... <••····••t~i11¢ •·· 
:uurr r r /it •~~~i;¥¢~r 
. . . • • : >>> Q~f•tj~ij . .... : ...... :·..__ ____ _, 
Manfo:tenanc.e •:•:::•:::::•:::::•:•:•:•:•:•:::•:•:•:•:::•:• 
-rf~ih1~f / .. · lri~~~~ij1f i;~ 
•::•:: 'Renat>ie :::••••:•::::••• 
.·.·.·.·- 1 .·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. ·.·.·.·.·.·. 
<:: : l ·~iP,n.i#.Jt; } -. . . . _ 
.·.·c.·.· .• . · ... ·;.d<f <· •::::::: }~li>:liv:~t~: I : : ::::::: :::: : 
: <rf()(l(i~N~i<·----------
Aftiviti~~>< 
..................... 
... . ... . . . . . ....... . 
,__ ____ ,: Jrit~gf~t•~~ ~( 
Figure 3. Components of a productive system. 
Source: Adapted from Reason (1990). 
•:: human and ••:::• 
r : • :,f<i~~~•~l / 
• ~iemeitts> •• ·.·. 
16 
1, > Products 
The construction industry can be viewed as a complex productive system 
whose "product" is the safe conduct of bui I ding operations. One of the key elements 
is the activity of builders, the front line operators. The "productive activities" , in 
turn, require the effective integration of human and mechanical elements within the 
system (e.g. , the effective worker-construction machine interfaces) so that safe 
building operations can take place. Before productive activities can occur, certain 
"preconditions" such as reliable and well-maintained equipment, and a well-trained 
and professional workforce, need to exist. Airport builders work within a highly 
structured organization that requires effective management and careful supervision. 
And such management and supervision is needed across numerous departments 
within the organization including operations, maintenance and training. Most 
managers need guidance, personnel, and resources to perform their duties effectively. 
This support comes from decision-makers who are further up the chain-of-command, 
charged with setting goals and managing available resources. They have the job of 
balancing oft-competing goals of safety and productivity, which for construction 
companies includes safe, on-time, cost-effective operations. Corporate decision are 
made based on social, economic, and political inputs coming from outside the 
organization as well as feedback provided by managers and workers from within. 
Reason proposed that accidents occur when there was a breakdown in the interactions 
among the components involved in the production process. These failures corrupted 
the integrity of the system making it more vulnerable to operational hazards, and 
hence more susceptible to catastrophic failures. These failures he described as the 
"holes" within the different layers of the system; thereby transforming what was once 
a productive process into a failed or broken down one. This theory is often referred 
to as the "Swiss cheese" model of accident causation and is showed in Figure 4. 
17 
IQtt•~~~~~i:: Latent Failures 
....... . .... . ......... 
••·••• 1nttu.enc~•·•···•· 
Latent Failures 
Failed or 
Absent Defenses 
Figure 4. The "Swiss cheese" model of accident caustion. 
Source: Adapted from Reason (1990). 
Latent and/or 
Active Failures 
:>: b. : 
o · 
Active Failures 
Accident 
18 
According to Reason's (1990) "Swiss cheese" model, accident investigators 
must analyze all areas and levels of the system to understand fully the causes an 
accident. For example, working backwards in time from the accident, and assessing 
the unsafe acts of operators that have ultimately led to the accident, etc. The latter 
can be referred as worker errors, and these active failures can be directly linked to the 
event. For instance, failing to clear the area before excavation work may yield 
relatively immediate, and potentially grave, consequences. Represented as failed 
defences or "holes" in the cheese, these active failures are typically the last unsafe 
acts committed by the excavator. This model also forces investigators to address 
latent failures within the causal sequence of events. Latent failures may lie dormant 
or undetected for some time until one day they adversely affect the unsuspecting 
construction worker. Investigators may easily overlook them. Consequently, 
Reason described three more levels of human failure that contribute to the breakdown 
of a productive system. The first level involved conditions that directly affect 
operator performance. The second level , referred to as preconditions for unsafe acts, 
concern conditions such as mental fatigue or improper communication and 
coordination practices. If fatigued construction workers fail to communicate and 
coordinate the activities with others in the construction site or individuals outside the 
site (e.g., electricity supply, gas supply, water supply), poor decisions are made and 
errors often result. Communication and coordination break down could also be 
traced back to instances of unsafe supervision, the third level of human failure. For 
example, two inexperienced welders are paired with each other and sent on a job in 
an open area 111 ram. If they have inadequate training in cooperation, the potential 
for miscommunication and ultimately, welder errors, is magnified. It appears that 
intervention and mitigation strategies may lie higher at the supervisory level within 
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the system. In addition, Reason's model showed that the organization itself could 
impact performance at all levels. For instance, in an economic recession where 
money is limited, organizations are highly financially motivated to cut costs. 
Training is invariably a key target. Organization's wrongly believe that they can 
reduce a training budget with little consequence to productive outcomes. Any 
expense cutting activity is justified in terms of the "bottom line" . Not only is the 
expenditure on training often reduced, but so too the overall time budgeted for the 
construction activity. Supervisors are often left with no alternative but to task 
poorly skilled workers with undertaking tasks beyond their level of competency. 
Communication and coordination failures often begin to appear as do other 
preconditions which affect performance and heighten the probability for construction 
workers' errors. Therefore, investigators and analysts must examine the accident 
sequence in its entirety and expand it beyond the construction site. Eventually, 
causal factors at all levels within the organization must be addressed. 
Strengths and Limitations of Reason's Model 
Reason's "Swiss cheese" model of human error integrates the human error 
perspectives into a single unified framework. For example, the model is based on 
the principle that building operations can be viewed as a complex productive system 
(ergonomic perspective), that often breaks down because of ill-fated decisions made 
by upper level management and supervisors ( organizational perspective). However, 
the impact that these unsound decisions have on safe operations may lie dormant for 
long periods of time until they produce unsafe operating conditions, such as poorly 
maintained equipment (ergonomic perspective), as well as unsafe builder conditions, 
such as fatigue (aeromedical perspective) or miscommunications among operators 
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(psychosocial perspective). All of these factors in turn affect an operators' ability to 
process information and perform efficiently (cognitive perspective). T he result is an 
incident or accident. However, Reason's model fa ils to identi fy the exact nature of 
the "holes" in the cheese. It is important to know what these system failures or 
"holes" are so that they can be identified during accident investigations or better yet 
detected and corrected before an accident occurs. Reason's mode l is primarily 
descriptive and not an analytical paradigm. It is so theoretical that analysts, 
investigators and other safety professionals would have a difficult task applying it to 
the rea l world. 
The Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
Reason' s human error "Swiss cheese" model provides a comprehensive theory 
of human error and accident causation. It does not provide an operational means for 
rectifying the reasons for the "holes". In contrast, the Human Factor Analys is and 
Classification System (HFACS) was designed to define the " ho les in the cheese" , the 
latent and active failures fac ilita ting the application of this model to accident 
investigation and analysis (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997a; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 200 I). 
Although designed originally fo r use within the context of military aviation, Hf ACS 
can also be effective w ithin the civil aviation arena (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000b) 
and construction industry. HFACS describes fou r levels of fa ilure, each of which 
corresponds to one of the four layers contained within Reason's model. These 
include: I) Unsafe Acts, 2) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 
4) Organizational Influences, and they are showed in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). 
Source: Adaptedfr0111 Shappell and Wiegmann (2000a) . 
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The unsafe acts of operators have two main categories: errors and violations. 
Errors can represent the mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve 
their intended outcomes. Humans by their nature make errors and these unsafe acts 
dominate most accident occurrences. Violations refer to the wilful disregard for the 
rules and regulations that govern safety. It is a difficult issue to be dealt with as 
violations are hard to predict. Rasmussen (1982) and Reason (1990) suggested three 
error types: skill -based, decision and perceptual errors and two form of violations: 
routine and exceptional. Skill-based errors occur without significant conscious 
thought and are particularly vulnerable to failures of attention and/or memory. 
When under stressful situations, skill-based errors are more apparent. Decision 
errors represent intentional behaviour that proceeds as planned yet the plan itself 
proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. These are "honest mistakes" 
but the individuals did not have the appropriate knowledge or simply chose poorly. 
Decision errors have three general categories: procedural errors, poor choices and 
problem-solving errors . Procedural decision errors (Orasanu, 1993), and rule based 
errors (Rasmussen, 1982) occur during highly structured tasks ( e.g., if A, then do B). 
Much of the shot-firers (workers use explosive to flatten hills or old houses) decision 
making is procedural, and error can occur when a situation is either not recognized or 
misdiagnosed and the wrong procedure is applied. This is particularly true when the 
shot-firers are placed in emergency situations. As many circumstances have no 
corresponding procedures to deal with them, many situations require a choice to be 
made among multiple response options. Sometimes one chooses well and 
sometimes does not. Choice decision errors or knowledge-based mistakes as they 
are otherwise known may occur. This is particularly true when there is insufficient 
experience, time or other outside pressure that may preclude safe decisions . 
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Decision errors differ markedly from skill-based errors in that the former involve 
deliberate and conscious acts while the latter entail highly automated behaviour. 
When one's perception of the world differs from reality, errors occur. The 
unsuspecting individual is often left to make a decision that is based on faulty 
information (e.g., m spatial disorientation or with visual illusions). Routine 
violations tend to be habitual by nature and often tolerated by governing authority 
(Reason, 1990) ( e.g., drive 80 mph in a 70 mph zone) . However, exceptional 
violations appear as isolated departures from authority, not necessarily indicative of 
an individual's typical behaviour pattern, nor condoned by management (Reason, 
1990) (e.g., drive 120 mph in a 70 mph zone). 
When analysing the preconditions for unsafe acts, factors to consider include 
the condition of the operators, the environmental factors and the personnel factors 
(Shappell, & Wiegmann, 1997b ). Dangers that may affect the condition of the 
operators include: adverse mental states (e.g. , loss of situational awareness, task 
fixation, distraction and mental fatigue due to sleep loss and other stressors, 
personality traits , malicious attitudes, etc.), adverse physiological states (e.g., visual 
illusions, spatial disorientation, physical fatigue, illnesses, medications, etc.) and 
physical/mental limitations (refers to those instances when the operational 
requirements exceed the capabilities of the individual, e.g., poor vision, poor hearing, 
lack of tolerance to compressed air work , no mental ability or aptitude to work, 
anthropometric reasons, etc.). Environmental factors comprise the physical 
environment and technological environment. The former refers to both the 
operational environment ( e.g., weather, underground/underwater work, terrain, etc.), 
and the latter the ambient environment (e .g., heat, vibration, lighting, toxic substances 
in the workplace). The technological environment encompasses the design of 
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equipment and controls, display/interface characteristics, checklist layouts, task 
facto rs and automation. For example, the similarities of control switches often cause 
confusion among machine operators. Personnel factors refer to poor 
communications and coordination as well as personal readiness. The former could 
be improved through training and for the latter, the workers must use good judgment 
when deciding whether they are " fit to operate" a machine (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
19976; 1999). 
Unsafe superv1s1on generally includes inadequate superv1s10n, planned 
inappropriate operations, failure to correct a known problem and supervisory 
violations. The role of any supervisor is to provide their perso1mel the opportunity 
to succeed, and they must provide guidance, training, leadership, oversight, incentives, 
etc. to ensure the job is done safely, effectively and efficiently (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
20006 ). However, some corporations provide little if any supervision in the genesis 
of human factors . Planned inappropriate operations like improper underwater 
worker pairing can create an authoritarian gradient which may contribute to 
accident/incidents. If the supervisor knew that a diving worker was incapable of 
diving safely and allowed the dive anyway, the supervisor clearly failed to correct a 
known problem. Likewise, the failure to consistently correct or discipline 
inappropriate behaviour fosters an unsafe atmosphere and promotes the violation of 
rules . 
Organizational factors such as resource management, organizational climate 
and organizational process can influence accidents/incidents. Resource management 
covers all the corporate-level decision-making regarding the allocation and 
maintenance of organizational assets like human resources, monetary assets, 
equipment, facilities and training. In times of economic austerity, safety and 
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training are often cut. Excessive cost-cutting could result in reduced funding for 
new equipment, the purchase of low-cost but less e ffecti ve alternatives, or simply no 
support equipment. Organizational climate can be viewed as the working 
atmosphere within the organization. The organi zational structure as reflected in the 
chain of command, delegation of authority, communication channels, formal 
accountability for actions, etc. can all affect safety (Muchinsky, 1997). The 
organizational culture, the unofficial or unspoken rules, values attitudes, beliefs, 
customs, etc. are important variables related to climate and can influence accidents. 
When organizational policies are ill-defined, adversarial or conflicting, or when they 
are supplanted by unofficial rules and values, confusion abounds. Organizational 
process refers to corporate decisions and rules that govern the everyday activities 
within an organization, including the establishment and use of standard operating 
procedures and the balance between the workforce and management. Nevertheless, 
any non-standard procedure can introduce unwanted variabi li ty into the operation. 
Likewise, operational tempo, time pressure and work schedules are all variables that 
can adversely affect safety. Furthermore, organizations need to address 
contingencies and have oversight ri sk management programmes. 
Human error in occupational accidents 
Feyer and Williamson (1991 ) used a comprehensive classification system, 
which allowed operational analysis o f the events preceding accidents. This was 
applied to the analysis of information surrounding the occurrence of all traumatic 
work-related fatalities in Australia in 1982- 1984. The coded information included 
factors immediately antecedent to the accident lead ing to the fatality and factors 
removed in time which contributed to the occurrence of the accident. The complex 
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network of events leading up to the accident, their interrelationships, and their 
relative contribution to causing the accident were examined. The results provided 
information about the use of accident analysis for the formulation of preventive 
strategies. Human error, poor work practices and environment factors were found 
to be the most frequent antecedent of fatalities. Human error was not only the 
commonest prime cause of accidents but also frequently exited in the precursor event 
sequence. Other contributing factors to accidents were drugs and alcohol 
involvements. Their results confirmed that accidents were the outcome of a 
complex network of interrelated factors which were not equivalent in causal 
significance. They concluded that targets for prevention must be much more 
specifically defined. 
Feyer, Williamson and Cairns (1997) analysed the information surrounding the 
occurrence of all traumatic work-related fatalities in Australia over the years 1982 to 
1984. They further examined the nature of work practices involved in these 
fatalities and their relationship to subsequent behavioural events in the accident 
sequence. The most common work practices were those associated with procedures 
either originating from management or individual practices. Examination of the 
association of particular work practices with the occurrence of subsequent human 
errors revealed that the origin of the unsafe practice varied for different error types. 
Individual worker practices, safety equipment and personal protective equipment 
practices were all associated with later skill-based errors. In contrast, management 
practices were associated with knowledge-based errors, while general equipment 
practices were associated with rule-based errors. These findings provided evidence 
for the view that aspects of work organization provided the circumstances in which 
later events might precipitate the accident. Moreover, Feyer, et al. , (1997) suggested 
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that being able to identify the precursors of critical events, and, in particular, those 
events that were difficu lt to directly target could prov ide a specific focus for 
prevention. Knowledge-based errors could be directly targeted for prevention, 
whereas for skill-based errors the only avenue for prevention lay in targeting the 
surrounding circumstances. Many studies of the patterns of accident causation 
revealed that pre-existing poor work practices were the most common precursors of 
human errors precipitating fatalities. Feyer et al. , (1997) named the pre-existing 
poor work practices contributing factors and they suggested that the combinations of 
these factors with human errors were the common causes for work- related fatalities. 
The contributing fac tors taxonomy used in the current study are defined and shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Contributing factors taxonomy used in the current study. 
Factor 
Fatigue 
Work pressure 
Coord ination 
Tra ining 
Supervis ion 
Previous 
deviation 
Procedures 
Equipment 
Environment 
Phys iological 
Definiti on 
Mental or physica l fatig ue, genera ll y related to a lack of adequate night time 
sleep and/or transitioning on to night shi ft work. 
Work being perfo rmed under unusual/unreasonab le time pressure or haste. 
Inadequate teamwork and communication between workers. 
Knowledge based sk ill defic ienc ies. 
Inadequate supervision or support of workers. 
Incorrect perfo rmance of a task at an earli er time which was not noted or 
corrected. 
Poorly des igned, poor ly documented, or non-ex istent procedures, or when a 
poor deviation fro m correct procedu res was ro uti nely ignored or accepted by 
management and/or operational personnel. 
Poor ly des igned or ma intained equipment or too ls, or a lack of necessary 
equipment, includi ng a lack of necessary spare parts. 
The phys ica l environment in which the work was bei ng perfo rmed, which was 
beyond the contro l of the worker ( e.g., darkness, glare, height, excess ive noise, 
poor ventilation, etc.). 
The worker 's perfo rmance was affected by drugs, alcohol, a medical condition 
or other adverse phys iologica l status. 
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In understanding the safety climate or culture of a workplace, the perceptions 
and attitudes of the workforce are important factors in assessing safety needs. 
Safety solutions were likely to be unsuccessfu l if they do not take into account these 
prevailing attitudes and perceptions. Changes in attitudes and perceptions about 
safety were often expected outcomes of safety interventions. Williamson, Feyer, 
Cairns and Biancotti, (1997) developed a measure of worker perception and attitudes 
about safety as an indicator of safety culture in the workplace. Their findings 
concurred with the well-known beliefs about safety in the working community which 
need to be understood in order to progress the concept of a safety culture. DeJoya, 
Schaffer, Vandenberg and Butts, (2004) found that various work situation factors 
directly affected on perceived safety at work; safety climate influenced perceived 
safety at work but its role as a mediator was limited. Neal , Gri, and Hart, (2000) 
discovered that the effect of general organizational climate on safety performance 
was mediated by safety climate, while the effect of safety climate on safety 
performance was partially mediated by safety knowledge and motivation. 
Several management practices have been cited as important components of 
safety programme. Vredenburgh (2002) examined the degree to which six 
management practices frequently included in safety programs (management 
commitment, rewards, communication and feedback, selection, training, and 
participation) contributed to a safe work environment for hospital employees. She 
found that hospitals that employed proactive measures to prevent accidents had low 
injury rates. Her study suggested that simply introducing safety training 
programmes was not enough. She suggested that a more effective approach for 
hospitals to take was in their recruitment and selection of new staff. Further, she 
proposed that any appointment of staff to manage safety risks within an organization 
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should be at a relatively senior management level. 
In a study by Cooper and Phillips (2004), they suggested that safety climate 
referred to the degree to which employees believed that real priority was given to 
organizational safety performance and measurement which was capable of providing 
an early warning of potential safety system failure(s). They further proposed that 
the climate-behaviour-accident path is not as clear cut as commonly assumed. This 
study examined the hypothesized a contributing factor-human factors-injury pathway 
and with its associated factors. 
Associations between human error and contributing factors in the construction 
industry 
Although Cacciabue (1997) and Hollnagel (1993) called the taxonomies based 
on the outward forms of errors error phenotypes, these descriptions tend to be area 
specific, give few insights into error causation, and provide limited guidance for 
corrective interventions. Cognitive models of human error, however, may help to 
reveal fundamental forms, or underlying error genotypes. A variety of generic 
cognitive taxonomies have been used to account for errors in safety-critical 
environments (see Senders & Moray, 1991 ). Reason's model of unsafe acts (1990), 
which is a development of his earlier generic error modelling system (GEMS; Reason, 
1987), draws on the skill-rule-knowledge (SRK) distinction of Rasmussen (1983) and 
the slip/mistake dichotomy of Norman (1981 ), but it also includes rule violations as a 
distinct form of unsafe act. Although Rasmussen ( 1983) and Reason (1990) have 
not aimed to explain skill development, their taxonomies clearly encapsulate 
important distinctions between levels of cognitive control as a person deals with 
progressively more familiar and predictable situations (Anderson, 1982; Fitts & 
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Posner, 1967). The difference between skill-based errors and mistakes involving 
intended actions is also consistent with the automatic/controlled distinction of Shiffrin 
and Schneider (1977), with skill- and knowledge-based errors relating to automatic 
and controlled processing, respectively. Rule-based errors are associated with 
controlled processing lying between the extremes of skill- and knowledge-based 
performance. Such behaviour fits well with the concept of Bartlett (1932), in which 
the person possesses a previously developed solution that can be applied in familiar 
situations. Additionally, the identification of violations as a distinct form of error 
has been supported by studies of driver behaviour (Aberg & Rimmoe, 1998; Parker, 
Reason, Manstead & Stradling, 1995). 
Reason's (1990) taxonomy has been used extensively in the analysis of accident 
case studies (e .g. , Lucas, 1997; Maurino, Reason, Johnston & Lee, 1995) and has 
been adapted for use in several accident investigation models, including Tripod Beta 
(Shell International Exploration & Production RV, 1994), incident cause analysis 
method (Hayward, Lowe & Gibb, 2002; ICAM), and the human factors analysis and 
classification system (HFACS) of Shappell and Wiegmann (2000). Nevertheless, 
very few published studies have applied Reason's ( 1990) taxonomy to errors drawn 
from workplace injury databases. 
As has been pointed out earlier, accidents on construction sites are a maJor 
cause of morbidity and mortality in Hong Kong. In 1993 there were 56,226 
construction workers in 1993 of which 16,573 (35.4%) suffered a workplace injury. 
The unsafe behaviour of human operators is a well known threat to the safety of 
complex technological systems, and is a significant concern to the Hong Kong 
construction industry. The Labour Department of Hong Kong reported that the most 
frequent construction site errors were untidiness, causing people to fall or trip; hand 
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tools, power tools and plants not being used properly; poor manual handling; personal 
protective equipment not being worn when it should be; getting too close to an 
operating plant and people were fooling around. 
Heinrich (1941) and Reason (1990) proposed that errors occurred in response 
to causal factors. Hawkins (1993) and International Civil Aviation Organization 
(1995) showed that a great range of potential error factors were related to virtually 
every aspect of human performance in technological systems. Construction work is 
performed in an environment that contains many potential error-producing conditions 
and its workers also routinely contend with inadequately designed documentation and 
plans, time pressures, shift work, and environmental extremes. Despite the 
increasing interest in construction site error, limited information is currently available 
on the cognitive forms that these errors take and the factors that promote them. The 
main reason for this is that unlike aircrew errors, construction site errors can remain 
latent for significant periods before an accident or incident occurs, making the work 
of an investigator particularly difficult. Furthermore, unlike pilots or air traffic 
controllers, construction site personnel are not subject to data or voice recording for 
investigation purposes , and investigators sometimes have a difficult job establishing 
the circumstances surrounding construction site errors. Additionally, many of the 
existing data on construction site errors are stored in company files and are not 
available to the public. 
Although information on construction site errors 1s scarce, errors in other 
industries have been studied extensively with a range of cognitive error taxonomies 
(e.g., O'Hare, Wiggins, Batt & Morrison, 1994; Runciman et al., 1993 ; Wagenaar & 
Groeneweg, 1987). However, the links between errors and contributing factors have 
received little attention. In many studies of safety databases, errors and contributing 
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factors are analyzed independently of each other, and their frequencies are reported in 
separate, unlinked tables. Hence, the lessons learned in one context may not be 
generalized to other realm. For example, identifying that skill-based errors are the 
most frequent errors committed by locomotive drivers (Edkins & Pollock, 1997) may 
not necessarily indicate what to expect in other industries. In addition, the 
comprehensive lists of contributing factors found in many accident investigation 
frameworks , although providing useful guidance to investigators on a case-by-case 
basis, are less useful for database analysis . When factors are placed into a large 
number of categories, the differences between accident cases would be emphasized 
and the similarities obscured. Therefore, it is preferable to focus on the associations 
between categories within data sets, such as those between errors and contributing 
factors. This kind of information may be more readily generalizable across domains. 
It may help in accident prevention where strategies could be targeted at key factors 
that contribute to error. Human error probabilities can also be estimated with greater 
accuracy and organizational safety performance be monitored by evaluating the 
relative prevalence of conditions that are known to promote errors. Only a few 
studies have explored the links between errors and contributing factors. Feyer, et al. , 
(1997) used the SRK framework to analyze data relating to more than 1000 
workplace fatalities in Australia. They identified links between particular error 
forms and specific pre-existing work practices within the deceased workers' 
organizations. They found that skill-based slips were associated with pre-existing 
unsafe work practices in the use of personal protective equipment. Although not 
strictly a study of errors and contributing factors , Salminen and Tallberg (1996) 
linked skill, rule, and knowledge-based errors with the type of work being performed 
at the time of serious occupational accidents in Finland. They found that errors were 
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not evenly distributed across work tasks. Skill-based errors were most common 
when workers were using manual tools, whereas errors on supervision tasks tended to 
be knowledge based. The purpose of the current study was to examine the 
associations between different human error types and the circumstances in which they 
occurred. 
It was generally thought that error-producing factors increased the prevalence 
of all errors equally. However, as errors appear to reflect a range of cognitive 
origins, it seems more likely that specific contributing factors would be associated 
with particular forms of human error. For example, the conditions that promote 
errors of automatic performance (such as slips) would be different from those that 
promote mistakes involving controlled processing (such as rule-based or 
knowledge-based errors). Automatic performance can be expected to be highly 
reliable in a task environment that is consistent and predictable; however, tasks that 
involve variability between cues and required responses would be associated with less 
reliability in skilled performance (Fisk, Ackennan & Schneider, 1987). Lawton and 
Parker (1998) proposed that violations were likely to be associated with contributing 
factors different from those that promote other unsafe acts . They noted that 
motivational factors , unrealistic work demands, and unworkable procedures were 
particularly likely to lead to rule violations. Battmann and Klumb (1993) considered 
that work and time pressures were significant precursors of violation. At least two 
possibilities exist regarding the associations between errors and factors: firstly, the 
presence of a contributing factor will be associated with a general increase in the 
prevalence of all forms of error; secondly, particular contributing factors will be 
associated with increases in the prevalence of specific errors, rather than an overall 
increase in all forms of error. In order to evaluate these possibilities, data from 
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construction site injuries was collected and analyzed using the research methodology 
reported by Hobbs and Williamson (2003). This approach enabled errors to be 
examined within their ecological context, maintaining intact the links between errors 
and contributing factors . 
The objectives of this research 
Accidents on construction sites are a major cause of morbidity and mortality in 
Hong Kong. This study has been designed to investigate the likely causes of 
occupational injuries that were present among the CLK construction workers. In 
order to accumulate the requisite information, over 1200 accident investigation 
reports in a four-year period (1993-1996) were reviewed. The first part of the 
investigation intents to demonstrate the pattern of occupational injuries among 
construction workers during the construction of the new CLK Airport in Hong Kong, 
causes and circumstances leading to occupational injuries, the magnitude of risk 
factors in occupational accident, and to compare the accident rates of the CLK 
workers with those of the construction industry in Hong Kong as a whole. This 
section examined the effects of the workplace infrastructure at CLK in order to 
explain why this site presented fewer work place injuries and accidents than other 
workplaces. It would also identify some unsafe actions and unsafe conditions and 
personal factors relevant to the accidents and highlight some solutions that might help 
to prevent or reduce workplace hazards. 
It has long been observed that unsafe behaviour among human operators is one 
of the most pressing threats to the safety of complex technological systems. In 
recent years cognitive error models have provided insights into the unsafe acts that 
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lead to many accidents and a variety of generic cognitive taxonomies have been used 
to account for errors in safety-critical environments (Senders, 1991 ). It has been 
estimated that human error is involved in 58% of medical misadventures (Leape et al. , 
1991 ), 70% of aircraft accidents (Hawkins , 1993), and 80% of shipping accidents 
(Lucas, 1997). However, the human factors causes of accident are only partially 
understood and most of the recent accident causation models are still based on the 
notion that a sequence of events or the contributing factors which lead to human error 
can be identified and appropriate strategies developed to mitigate the occurrence of 
these contributory elements. There has been little published information on possible 
links between specific human error types and contributing factors in workplace 
accidents and m3unes. The second part of this research seeks to analyse the 
associations between the types of human errors with the kinds of occupational injuries 
and with the sorts of contributing factors that would most likely trigger these 
construction site accidents at CLK. 
The research applied a similar research methodology as that reported by Hobbs 
and Williamson (2003) in their study of error types and contributing factors to 
accidents and errors in aircraft maintenance. The Hobbs and Williamson study 
developed a safety questionnaire to collect data on critical incidents and occurrences. 
This information was used to analyse the circumstances which led up to the 
occurrence of each adverse outcome, using a technique developed by Feyer and 
Williamson (1991 ). This approach allowed occurrences to be broken down into a 
sequence of events or human errors, and when appropriate , linking the contributing 
factors which led to each occurrence. In the Hobbs and Williamson study a very 
useful statistical technique known as "correspondence analysis" (Clausen, 1998) was 
used to illustrate the "corresponding" relationship between errors and their 
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contributing factors . Using the technique the data could be converted into visual 
forms which made interpretation easier to understand. 
The study would help in assisting the design of accident prevention training 
and education strategies, the estimation of human error probabilities, and the 
monitoring of organizational safety performance in the construction industry in Hong 
Kong. 
METHODS 
Participants 
From 1 January 1993 to 31 December 1996, there were 19153 worksite 
incidents at the CLK construction site requiring consultations at the on-site medical 
centre. Of these, 1236 were for injuries sustained while working at the worksite . 
Materials 
Medical records and incident/accident investigation reports prepared by the 
on-site medical centre and the safety department respectively were made available for 
this study. The medical centre served all the workers at the CLK construction site, 
24 hours a day and 365 days a year and captured all the injuries occurring on-site. It 
used the "Type of Occurrence Classification" as specified in the Compendium of 
Workers' Compensation Statistics, Australia (1996-97) to categorize the nature of 
injury, bodily location of injury, mechanism of injury and agents involved. However, 
for ethical reason, only the summary reports of the accidents and causes of the 
accidents which had been collated on a monthly basis from the original accident and 
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